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Abstract 
We study collaborative and non-collaborative projects that are supported by government grants. First, we 
propose a theoretical framework to analyze optimal decisions in these projects. Second, we test our 
hypotheses with a unique dataset containing academic publications and research funds for all the 
academics at the major engineering departments in the UK. We find that the type of the project (measured 
by its level of appliedness) is increasing in the type of both the university and firm partners. Also, the 
quality of the project (number and impact of the publications) increases with the quality of the researcher 
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quality of the project only when the firms' characteristics make them valuable partners.  
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1. Introduction   
In the last three decades universities have enlarged their entrepreneurial activity in many dimensions, 
including patenting and licensing, creating science parks, promoting university spin-outs, investing equity 
in start-ups, and collaborating with industry in research projects (see, for example, Mowery et al., 2004, 
and Siegel, 2006). Nowadays, the industry considers university-industry collaborative links through joint 
research, consulting or training arrangements, as important channels of knowledge transfer (Cohen et al., 
2002). As a result, research contracts and joint research agreements are widespread (D'Este and Patel, 
2007). 
Collaborative projects have important benefits both for industry and academia. They give firms access to 
highly qualified scientists and help them keep up-to-date with new ideas and explore the applications of 
new scientific discoveries. Academics provide assistance with experimentation, access to the analytic 
skills of the university, or the use of equipment (e.g., Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). Academic 
researchers may also benefit from the access to new questions and research funds. In addition, research 
partners can exploit economies of scale and scope in the generation of R&D and benefit from the 
synergies related to the exchange of complementary know-how. 
In terms of production of research output, however, collaboration with industry has ambiguous effects. 
On the one hand, industry involvement might delay or suppress academic publication, endangering the 
intellectual commons and the practices of open science (Nelson, 2004, and Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
Industry collaboration might also skew the type of research projects towards more applied contents 
(Florida and Cohen, 1999). Faculty participating in knowledge and technology transfer activities, on the 
other hand, claim that industry collaboration improves research outcomes (Lee, 2000). 
This paper studies the research output of university-industry research collaborations supported by 
government grants. We first provide a theoretical framework describing the process that leads to the 
outputs of collaborative and non-collaborative research projects. The process includes the negotiation of 
the type of the project in which partners will work on, as well as the investment levels each partner 
devotes in to the project. Our theoretical framework ends up making predictions on the characteristics of 
the outputs, such as type and quantity of publications, as a function of the characteristics of the partners, 
such as efficiency and preferences. We then test our model and measure empirically the impact of the 
characteristics of the partners on the outcome of each specific project. 
In our theoretical framework, project outcomes are defined by type (degree of basicness or appliedness) 
and quality (quantity and impact of the publications). Typically, university researchers and laboratories 
prefer projects of a basic nature. Firms, in contrast, expect higher benefits from projects that can be more 
easily applied. In a non-collaborative project, the researcher takes decisions taking into account her 
preferences only. In collaborative projects, the partnership decides on a type of project taking into account 
the interest of both participants. Through the investment decisions, the characteristics of the partners 
affect the quality of the research output. Both partners boost their investment when they place more value 
on the output and when their technical and scientific level is higher. Investment is also increasing when 
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their interests are more aligned. 
We expect a non-collaborative project to focus on more basic ventures than a collaborative project. In 
fact, the type of collaborative project is a weighted average of the preferences of project participants. The 
scientific level of the participants should not affect the type of project but its quality only. The quality of 
collaborative projects is not necessarily greater than the quality of non-collaborative projects. On the one 
hand, the quantity and impact of the output in collaborative projects should be higher because more 
partners invest. On the other hand, there are costs associated to the collaboration, in particular because 
university researchers and firm employees often have difficulties working together. Therefore, we expect 
the collaboration with firms to improve the final outcome when the firms' characteristics make them 
valuable partners while it might be detrimental otherwise. 
To test our theoretical findings, we construct a dataset containing academic research output (publications) 
and collaborative research funds for all the academics employed at the major engineering departments in 
the UK. We concentrate on the engineering sector, as it has traditionally been associated with applied 
research and industry collaboration and it contributes substantially to industrial R&D (Cohen et al., 2002). 
We measure the research output of projects that receive funding from the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the UK government agency for funding research in engineering and 
the physical sciences. The EPSRC evaluates projects based on their scientific content, as well as their 
potential impact on the current or future success of the UK economy. 
For each EPSRC project in which the engineering academics participated, we identified all the articles in 
the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI) published between 2008 and 2010 that cite them as a funding source. 
We take both the normal count and the impact-factor weighted count of publications as measures of 
quality of the project. As a measure of type, we use the Patent Board classification, version 2005, 
developed by Narin et al. (1976), which classifies journals according to their general research orientation. 
As proxies for the partners' characteristics, we use the average basicness-appliedness type and the number 
and impact of their publications in the period 2002-2007. Our final, representative sample includes 487 
research projects, 187 of which are collaborative and 300 are non-collaborative. 
Our dataset allows us to take into account not only the effect of the existence or the number of industrial 
partners but also the type of firms with which university researchers collaborate. Moreover, it allows us to 
directly measure the impact of the collaboration with industry on the outcome of a specific research 
project. 
First, we regress the project's output type with respect to the type of the researchers and the firms. In line 
with the results in our theoretical exercise, we obtain that the appliedness of the output is increasing in the 
appliedness of both the university and firm partners. Also, the type of project is not influenced by the 
scientific level of the researchers or the firms. 
Second, we consider the output of the project measured in terms of number of publications and their 
impact factor. As expected, funding has a positive and highly significant effect on the number and impact 
of publications. More efficient academic researchers also significantly improve the quality of the research 
output. In contrast, the effect of the publications of the firms is more complex: the intercept is negative 
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and the slope is positive. This indicates that, as suggested by the theoretical model, collaboration with 
firms with poor publication records (which may indicate low level of scientific knowledge and low 
absorptive capacity) leads to lower scientific output than a project developed by researchers alone. 
However, as the publications of the industry partners increase, the quality of the project improves and it 
becomes higher than that of non-collaborative projects. Finally, our regression confirms that the quality of 
the project is higher when the interest of the researcher and the firm are more aligned. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we do a brief literature review. Section 3 presents 
our theoretical framework, which develops the hypotheses concerning the type of project and the output 
as a function of whether the project involves an industry partner or not. We describe our database and test 
our predictions in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude. 
2. Literature Review 
Our theoretical framework is related to the work of Pereira (2007). She proposes a model to analyze the 
type of project that is decided in a collaborative agreement. Her objective is to emphasize that the 
characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners when 
informational problems are present.1 She shows how two different structures of partnership governance - 
centralized and decentralized - may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-
contractible resources. Lacetera (2009) builds a model to study whether it is optimal for a firm to conduct 
some research activities in-house or to outsource them to academic organizations. He focuses on the 
potential value of the commitment due to the outsourcing of the activity and on the discrepancy between 
scientific and economic value of the projects. 
In terms of evidence, survey studies (e.g., Blumenthal et al., 1986, and Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005) 
report that the choice of research topics of academics whose research is supported by industry were 
biased by their commercial potential.2 Some papers have tried to find evidence for this negative (so-called 
skewing) effect indirectly: by measuring the effect of industry collaboration on researcher publication 
patterns. Some papers use patenting and licensing as measures of industry collaboration (Azoulay et al., 
2009; Breschi et al., 2008; Hicks and Hamilton, 1999; Thursby and Thursby, 2002, 2007; van Looy et al., 
2006) while others use collaborative research agreements (Banal-Estañol et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) also find evidence of a change of behavior in the other side: collaboration 
with universities leads firms to more basic research-oriented. 
The literature has also studied the effect of industry collaboration on the quantity and impact of academic 
research output. In their report for the National Academy of Sciences, Merrill and Mazza (2010) conclude 
                                                          
1 Using survey data, Pereira and García-Fontes (2011) empirically test the influence of the type of 
inventor on the level of basicness of the patent. When the main inventor is employed by a firm, patents 
show a basicness index that is smaller than when the main-inventor is an academic researcher (although it 
is higher than when all inventors are firms' researchers). 
2 As Dasgupta and David (1994) pointed out, the goals and the incentives received from the institution 
scientists works for shape their preferences in terms of research. The links with the industry, while they 
have many positive consequences for the economy, have also raised concerns about the detrimental 
effects that more market-oriented activities may have on pure scientific production. The interests of the 
industry may divert university researchers from their main duty and some voices have pointed out that the 
increased secrecy and shifts in research interests may be an important concern. 
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that the majority of studies have not found evidence of negative effects of industrial collaboration (or 
commercially related faculty activity) on the publication counts and citation counts. Survey studies 
suggest that industry involvement is linked to higher academic productivity (e.g., Gulbrandsen and 
Smeby, 2005). Using patenting and licensing as collaboration measures, empirical papers find that 
patenting either does not affect publishing rates (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002, and Goldfarb et al., 
2009) or that the patenting and the quantity and impact of research output are positively related (Azoulay 
et al., 2009; Breschi et al., 2008; Calderini and Franzoni, 2004; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008; Stephan et 
al., 2007; van Looy et al., 2006). Using collaborative research as measure of industry involvement, 
Manjarres-Henriquez et al. (2009) and Banal-Estañol et al. (2010) uncover an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between industry collaboration and academic research output. The negative effect of high-
collaboration levels is also consistent with the survey results in Blumenthal et al. (1986) and the empirical 
evidence on NASA-funded academic researchers in Goldfarb (2008). 
Although our objective is not to evaluate the EPSRC program, we do obtain some conclusions on the 
outcome of the program. In this sense, our paper is related to the literature that evaluate projects and 
programs in terms of creation of knowledge, measured by the publications obtained by the researchers 
involved (see, for instance, Cozzens et al. 1994).  
Recent studies emphasize the importance of knowledge creation for the emerge of entrepreneurship. The 
contributions by Audretsch et al. (2006) and Acs et al. (2009) propose the knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship in which the creation of new knowledge expands the technological opportunity set. An 
important implication of this theory is that an increase in the stock of knowledge is expected to positively 
impact the degree of entrepreneurship. They also test empirically the theory and show that entrepreneurial 
opportunities are not exogenous but they are created by a high presence of knowledge spillovers. 
Therefore, programs like the one offered by the EPSRC not only contribute to an increase in the level of 
knowledge and publications but also, indirectly, to the emergence of entrepreneurial activity. In this 
sense, our study contributes to a better understanding of programs that help increase university 
entrepreneurship.3 
Our paper highlights that the level of firms' scientific publications has a strong positive influence on the 
outcome of the research programs. In their influential paper, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that a 
firm's absorptive capacity is critical to its innovative capabilities and influences its innovation decisions, 
in particular concerning the participation in cooperative R&D ventures. The past record of publications of 
a firm is a clear signal of its absorptive capacity and also of its ability to contribute to a research program. 
According to our results, this ability is crucial not only for the firm but also for the university researchers 
involved in collaborative projects. 
3. The theoretical framework   
To analyze the output of research projects that have received government financing, we introduce a 
                                                          
3 See Rothermael et al. (2007) for a detailed analysis and taxonomy of the literature that analyzes 
university entrepreneurship. 
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simple framework to analyze the participants' decisions.4 The projects are aimed at financing research; 
therefore, we focus on the decisions leading to academic publications. We abstract from other outputs, 
such as patents or transfer of know-how. 
We focus on two characteristics of the project: type and quality. The type is defined as the level of 
appliedness (or alternatively basicness) of the research developed in the project. The difference between a 
basic project and an applied one is not its scientific content or its originality but the potential applicability 
of the results. Typically, academic researchers are more inclined to solve general puzzles, whose potential 
application for the industry, at least in the short run, is small (basic research). Industry, and by 
consequence, firms that are involved in research tend to be interested in more applied questions. The 
quality is related to the level of the research developed in the project. We will measure the quality of the 
project through both the count of the publications obtained in the project and their impact factor. 
We address two questions: which type of project the partners choose? and how high is the quality of the 
project? We consider first projects that involve university researchers only and then those that include 
both academic researchers and firms. 
3.1. Non-collaborative projects 
Let us consider a university researcher (or a team of university researchers), that we denote by U, that has 
obtained funding IM for a research project on her own. The benefits that U obtains from the project 
depend on its type and quality, through the impact of the results of the project in her CV and academic 
career, or the consideration by peers in her field. 
The type of project, that is, its level of appliedness, can be represented by a parameter x. Researchers may 
have different preferences over this dimension. We denote U’s most preferred type by xU .  Projects have 
less value for U  if  x is different from xU ,  the larger the distance between the type x  and her most 
preferred type  xU ,  the larger the loss in value.5 
We represent the quality of the project by an index that reflects both the number and the impact of the 
publications derived from the project. Resources can be devoted to increase this index. The quality 
depends on the effort allocated by the researcher as well as on the amount IM obtained from the 
government. The effort can refer to the level of involvement of the researcher, the possible additional 
financing by the research lab, etc. Moreover, the quality of the project also depends on the efficiency (or 
ability) of U. 
In terms of predictions, the researcher selects the type of project that best suits its interest, xU . Moreover, 
we predict that the level of the researcher's dedication to the project is increasing with the value she 
allocates to the output, with her scientific level, and with the level of government financing IM . 
We now state the testable hypotheses on the type and quality of a non-collaborative project. 
Hypothesis 1: The type of a non-collaborative project is more applied as the level of appliedness of the 
                                                          
4 See Banal-Estañol et al. (2011) for the details of the theoretical model that formally develops the ideas 
presented in this section. 
5 In Banal-Estañol et al. (2011), we present a model in the spirit of the Hotelling model and describe this 
loss as transportation costs depending on the distance. 
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researcher increases.  
Hypothesis 2: The quality of a non-collaborative project increases with the scientific level of the 
researcher as well as with the amount of the grant. 
3.2. University-industry collaborative projects   
Consider now a project with government financing IM led by a researcher U  in collaboration with a firm 
F .  We denote F’s most preferred type of project by xF  and we consider that firms' preferences are more 
applied than universities': xF  >  xU . A firm values the quality of the project because it reflects the know-
how or applied knowledge acquired during the research that leads to the publications. Firms, as academic 
researchers, suffer a cost from moving from their ideal point in terms of research. The firm may invest in 
the project is several ways, including financial resources as well as firm's researchers effort. The level of 
investment may depend on the technical and scientific level of  F , its absorptive capacity, the level of its 
human capital, etc. 
The participants in a collaborative project must agree on a type x. One expects that they will compromise 
on a project less applied than  xF  and less basic than  xU  and agree on the one best suited for the 
partnership. The type chosen will be a weighted average of the optimal types for the researcher and the 
firm, where the weights depend on the value the partners allocate to the outcome of the project and also 
on the difficulties encountered when moving from the ideal project. 
The partners must also reach an agreement as to the level of their investment.6 At the optimal agreement, 
their investment is increasing in their technical and scientific level and they are decreasing in the distance 
between the most preferred types of project (xF    xU ) . 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 state the testable effect of changes in the exogenous parameters on the type and 
quality of collaborative projects. 
 Hypothesis 3:  The type of a collaborative project is more applied as the level of appliedness of the firm 
and the researcher increases.  
 Hypothesis 4:  The quality of a collaborative project increases with the scientific and technical level of 
the firm and the university researcher, as well as with the amount of the grant, and decreases with the 
distance between the level of appliedness of the researcher and that of the firm. 
3.3. Research outcomes in collaborative versus non-collaborative projects  
According to our previous discussion, it is immediate that collaborative projects are more applied than 
non-collaborative ones. There are no reasons for U to deviate from its most preferred type in a university 
undertaking while the type of project in a collaborative agreement reflects the interest of both the 
university researcher and the firm. 
                                                          
6 In our discussions we abstract from moral hazard issues concerning the free-riding problem that may 
arise in collaborative agreements (see, for example, Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís, 1996, for the moral 
hazard problem linked to the disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures; Pereira, 2007, for 
university-firm collaborations; and Lerner and Malmendier, 2010, for cases where the funding can be 
diverted to other projects). 
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The analysis of the comparison of the quality of collaborative and non-collaborative projects shows a 
trade-off. On the one hand, there are two reasons that suggest that collaborative projects should be more 
productive. First, both partners invest in a collaborative project while only the researcher works on a non-
collaborative one. Second, both partners are interested in the project, which increases the value of each 
publication. On the other hand, researchers and firms often encounter difficulties when they work with 
each other. Indeed, there is evidence that research collaboration often carries coordination costs due, 
among others things, to the difference in culture, priorities and values of universities and firms (e.g., 
Dasgupta and David, 1994; Champness, 2000; Cummings and Kiesler, 2007; and Lacetera, 2009).7 This 
tends to decrease the academic researchers' investment. 
Therefore, we should expect the quality of a collaborative project to be higher than that of a non-
collaborative project whenever the research level of the firm is high enough and/or its interest in basic 
research is strong enough. In fact, if the interest of the firm in basic research is strong, then we expect the 
quality of a collaborative project to be always higher. However, the quality may be lower when the 
collaboration costs are high and the firm's scientific ability is low.  
Hypothesis 5 states the expected relation between the types of collaborative versus non-collaborative 
projects. Hypotheses 6 and 7 reflect the two possibilities with respect to the comparison between the 
quality of the two types of projects. 
Hypothesis 5:  The type of a collaborative project is more applied than that of a non-collaborative 
project.  
Hypothesis 6:  The quality of a collaborative project is always higher than that of a non-collaborative 
project. 
Hypothesis 7: The quality of a collaborative project is higher than that of a non-collaborative project 
only when the firm's ability is high enough. 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our research projects are based on grants given by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council (EPSRC), the main UK government agency for funding research in engineering (amounting to 
more than  50% of overall funding of engineering department research projects). EPSRC supports 
excellent, long term research and high quality postgraduate training in order to contribute to the economic 
competitiveness of the UK and the quality of life of its people. One of the main missions of the EPSRC is 
promoting an enterprising culture of adventure and excitement in which people seize opportunities and 
make things happen. 
Some of the EPSRC grants include one or more firms as industry partners and are considered 
collaborative grants. As defined by the EPSRC, Collaborative Research Grants are grants led by academic 
researchers, but may involve other partners. Partners generally contribute either cash or ‘in-kind’ services 
                                                          
7 Okamura and Nishimura (2011) empirically find that public R&D subsidy improves coordination in 
university-industry research collaboration. 
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to the full economic cost of the research. The EPSRC encourages research in collaboration with the 
industry. As a result, around 35% of EPSRC grants presently involve partners from industry. 
Our starting point is the uniquely created longitudinal dataset in Banal-Estañol et al. (2010), which 
contains information on all researchers employed at the engineering departments of 40 major UK 
universities between 1985 and 2007. We identify all their articles in the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI) 
that acknowledged the EPSRC as a funding source. The Web of Knowledge has been systematically 
collecting information on funding sources from the acknowledgements since 2008. We consider only 
those articles that specify the grant number codes. Of course, some publications have been funded by 
multiple EPSRC funds and some EPSRC projects generate more than one publication. 
We analyze the articles that acknowledge an EPSRC project as a funding source in the period 2008-2010. 
We use the normal count of publications as proxy of the project's research output. We do not discount for 
the number of EPSRC funding sources of each publication as we do not have funding information about 
non-EPSRC sources. As a second measure, we also consider the impact-factor-weighted sum of 
publications, with the weights being the impact attributed to the publishing journal. To compute it, we use 
the SCI Journal Impact Factor (JIF), a measure of importance attribution based on the number of citations 
a journal receives to adjust for relative quality. Though not a direct measure for quality, the JIF represents 
the impact attributed to a particular journal by peer review. As the JIF of journals differs between years, 
and journals are constantly being added to the SCI, we use the closest available to the date of publication. 
As an indicator of the type of publication we use the Patent Board (formerly CHI) classification (version 
2005), developed by Narin et al. (1976) and updated by Kimberley Hamilton for the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). Based on cross-citation matrices between journals, it characterizes the general 
research orientation of journals, distinguishing between (1) applied technology, (2) engineering and 
technological science, (3) applied and targeted basic research, and (4) basic scientific research. Godin 
(1996) and van Looy et al. (2006) reinterpreted the categories as (1) applied technology, (2) basic 
technology, (3) applied science, and (4) basic science; and grouped the first two as technology and the last 
two as science. Following their definition, we define the level of appliedness of a set of articles as the 
number of publications in the first two categories divided by the number of publications in the four 
categories. Some of the articles were published in journals that had not been classified and are therefore 
discarded in the calculation of level of appliedness. 
Our data set consists of projects with at least one classified publication in the project output, at least one 
in the university input and at least one in the firm input. This left us with a final sample of 487 research 
projects,  187 of which are collaborative (involving at least one industrial partner) and  300  are non-
collaborative. For ease of comparison, we keep the same sample throughout the paper. (See Banal-Estañol 
et al. (2011) for further details on the descriptive statistics of the project.) 
Project output. We measure the type of the project defined in the theoretical framework using the type of 
the publications in the basic-applied space. The quality of the project is measured with the number and 
impact factor of the publications.  
Our final sample set of publications citing at least one of the 487 EPSRC projects up to December 31, 
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2010, contains 1,286 publications. The average number of publications in a research project in the period 
2008-2010 is 2.64 but the dispersion is high, with a standard deviation of 3.35. The most prolific project 
generated 47 recorded publications. If we take the sum of the impact factors of the journals in which the 
publications are published, projects have an average of 7.91 but again dispersion is high. Projects contain 
on average a non-negligible amount of publications in each of the four categories. Categories 2 and 3 
have the highest number of publications (0.79 and 0.67 on average) and category 1, the lowest (0.17 on 
average). The average level of the measure of appliedness of the projects outcome is around 0.52, 0.62 on 
average for the 187 projects that include firms and 0.45 for the 300 non-collaborative projects. 
University input. As a proxy for the type and scientific level of the 1,066 matched researchers, we use 
the type, count, and impact-factor-weighted sum of their publications in the last six years of the database 
(2002-2007).8 The average researcher in our database published 22.98 articles over the five-year period, 
with a total impact factor over 56. The average publication of the average researcher is more applied 
(0.58) than the average publication coming out of the project (0.52). This is probably due to the fact that 
past publications might also contain outputs from contract research and other collaborative projects with 
industrial partners. 
We consider the average of the researchers in each project because we do not have information about 
some of the researchers in the project (they are not in the dataset because they might be from other 
universities or from fields outside engineering). However, the number of missing researchers per project 
is small: the average number of researchers in our sample is  2.18 while it is 2.37  if we would also 
include those for whom we do not have information. 
Government funding and firm input. We also match our database with that of the EPSRC. The EPSRC 
database contains information on start year and duration of the grant, total amount of funding, names of 
principal investigators and coinvestigators, and names of the (potentially multiple) partner organizations. 
Most of the partner organizations are private companies but in some cases they can also be government 
agencies or other (mostly foreign) universities. We consider the private companies only. 
We collected information on all the articles published by the employees of these companies between 2002 
and 2007. We consider again the total number of publications, the impact-factor-weighted sum of 
publications, the total number of publications of each orientation category. For each of these variables, we 
also compute the average of all the industrial partners in each project. We use the same measure of type 
for the project partners as the one we use for the project output and for the researchers. 
We have 187 projects that include at least one firm research partner. Of those, the average number of 
partners is more than three. In each project, the average number of publications of the firm partners over 
the five-year period is more than 1,000. If weighted by the journal impact factor, the number is above 
three thousand. The quality of the research output of the firm is a combined measure of firm size and 
scientific level of the average researcher in the firm. The publications of the firms are less applied than 
                                                          
8 Most entries in the SCI database include detailed address data that helps to identify institutional 
affiliations and unequivocally assign articles to individual researchers. Publications without address data 
had to be ignored. However, this missing information is expected to be random and to not affect the data 
systematically. 
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those of the researchers (0.56 versus 0.58). This may be due to the difficulties that industry researchers 
face to publish their most applied work, because of a requirement of secrecy. The appliedness index of the 
publications of the researchers involved in collaborative projects is 0.63, superior to the ones running 
non-collaborative projects (0.55). 
 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 1 provides the results on the type of the output of the project. We regress the level of appliedness of 
the output of the project on the average level of appliedness of the researchers in the project and on the 
average level of appliedness of the firms. We allow the effect of the researcher to differ in collaborative 
and non-collaborative projects. We do not report the regressions which take logs of all the variables but 
the results are similar (see Banal-Estañol et al., 2011). 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
As predicted by hypotheses 1 and 3, the appliedness of the output is increasing in the appliedness of both 
university and firm partners. Both effects are highly significant. The effect of the researcher is not 
significantly different in collaborative and non-collaborative projects. In particular, the last two results 
also support Hypothesis 5: collaborative projects are indeed more applied than non-collaborative ones. 
The addition of the coefficients of the type of the researcher and the firm is close to one in column 1, 
which is in accordance with the prediction of the theory since the type of the project is a weighted average 
of the types of researcher and firm. We can also see that the effect of the appliedness of the researcher is 
stronger, which suggests that the results are more valuable for the universities than for the firms, that the 
firms are more flexible than the universities, and/or that the index of the researchers is more accurate than 
that of the firms. In the regression in logs, we can see that an increase in one percentage point in the 
appliedness of the researchers increase the appliedness of the project by 0.71 percentage points. The same 
increase in the appliedness of the firms increases the appliedness of the output by 0.2 percentage points. 
As a robustness check, we perform the same regression using the number of publications in category 1 
with respect to the total classified number of publications. Again, the appliedness of the output increases 
with the appliedness of both the university and firm partners. The effects are less strong but all except one 
are still highly significant. Using this measure, the effect of the researcher is significantly stronger in 
collaborative projects. For the same change in the level of appliedness of the researcher, the output is 
more applied. 
Finally, we also show that the type of project is not influenced by the quality of the researchers or the 
firms. In the last two columns, we regress the level of appliedness of the output on the normal count of 
publications of the researchers and firms in the project. None of the variables appear as significant, 
independently if we consider basic publications those of categories 1 and 2 or category 1 only. 
Table 2 provides the results on the quality of the project. Using both the normal count and the impact-
factor-weighted count of publications, we regress the count of publications of the project on the total 
funding, on the average count of publications of the researchers and on the total count of publications of 
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the firm partners. We allow for an intercept on the number of publications of the firm to separate 
collaborative with non-collaborative projects (non-collaborative projects are the only ones that have a 
zero publication number). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
As predicted by hypotheses 2 and 4, the effect of funding is positive and highly significant in all the 
regressions in Table 2. More efficient university researchers also significantly improve the quality of the 
research output. In the regression in logs, we find that an increase in one percent in the publication 
researcher record increase the count of publications by  0.066  percentage points and the weighted count 
by  0.247  percentage points. 
The effect of the publications of the firms is curvilinear, as the intercept is negative and the slope is 
positive, in accordance with Hypothesis 4. The effects are highly significant in the four columns except 
for the case in which we take logs in the normal count of publications. As a result, having firms with poor 
publication records is worse than having no firm partner at all. However, as the publications of the firm 
partners increase, the quality of the research output improves (the slope of the total account, or total 
weighed account, of firms' publications is significantly positive). Therefore, our empirical results support 
Hypothesis 7 and reject the alternative Hypothesis 6. Figure 1 plots the predicted values for the count of 
publications as a function of the publications of the average researcher and the firm. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
In the third block of columns of Table 4, we include the number of firms as an additional regressor. The 
linear effects of the scientific level of the researchers and firms are similar. Here, the intercept is still 
negative but insignificant, but the new continuous variable of the number of firms is negative and highly 
significant. The interpretation of this result is that, for a given number of publications of the firm partners, 
collaborating with less would be better. This is again consistent with our theory, which would suggest 
higher costs if a researcher collaborates with more firms. 
In the last two columns of Table 4, we include the distance between the level of appliedness of the firm 
and that of the researchers in the project. Independently of the use of logs or not, the coefficient is 
negative and significant. Therefore, the empirical results support the last prediction in Hypothesis 4: 
larger differences between the collaborating partners decrease the quality of the output coming out of the 
project. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide both a theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on the type and the quality of 
university-industry collaborative projects. Our theoretical framework posits that the project type takes 
into account the interests of both university researchers and firms. It also stresses that investment of the 
project are increasing in the partners' technical and scientific level and in the affinity of their interests. 
Through the investment decisions, the characteristics of the partners affect the quality of the research 
output. 
According to our theory, university researchers should produce more basic outputs if they do not 
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collaborate with industry. But, the effect of industry collaboration on the project's quality of the research 
output can have two opposite effects. On the one hand, collaboration increases investment levels, both 
because partners bring resources and because the academics have more incentives to invest. On the other 
hand, having collaborative partners increases the cost of the project because they might find difficulties in 
working together. Industry partners therefore improve project outcomes only if they are valuable partners. 
The empirical evidence supports the theoretical predictions. More basic researchers generate more basic 
output and more applied firms generate more applied output. We find no difference on the effect of 
researchers in collaborative and non-collaborative agreements. We also find that the projects in which 
more prolific researchers and more prolific firms work generate more and better publications. 
Again consistent with the theory, our empirical evidence shows that firm partners with low publication 
records decrease the quality of the project output whereas those with high levels improve project 
outcomes. According to our linear model, collaborating with firms which have publication records below 
the mean is worse than not collaborating with any firm. This means, taking our empirical model at face 
value, that collaborating with 80% of the firms in our sample decreases the number of publications of the 
project. Collaborating with firms, of course, can also have other advantages besides the impact on the 
publication record. 
One of the main contributions of this paper is to emphasize the importance of taking into account the type 
of firms with which university researchers collaborate, and not only the number of firms. Emphasizing 
collaboration with the right type of firm should be a beneficial policy. Our empirical analysis suggests 
that collaborating with firms that have a high average scientific level and that have similar interest to the 
researchers, improves the research output of government grants. Therefore, in the evaluation of research 
proposals, policy makers and managers of programs that fund research may want to take into account not 
only the scientific level of the university researchers and the interest of the project, but also the scientific 
level of the firms, as measured in particular by their past record of publications, and the affinity of the 
partners' past publication records. 
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Figure 1:  Predicted count of publications as a function of the count of publications of the average 
researcher of the project as well as a function of the total count of publications of the firm partners. For 
each line, all the other variables are kept at the predicted effect of the average value. In horizontal dashed 
line, we plot the predicted publications of a project without any partner. The count of the publications of 
the firm in the horizontal axis has been divided by 100. In vertical lines, we plot the mean count of 
researchers and firms for all projects. 
Average output of projects with no firm = 
1.772 + 0.001*723.190 + 0.026*22.983 
Firm’s average = 13.41 Researcher’s 
average = 22.98 
Input is publications 
of the firm partner 
Input is publications of 
the average researcher 
Appliedness output    
(1+2/1+2+3+4)
Appliedness output    
(1/1+2+3+4)
Appliedness output    
(1+2/1+2+3+4)
Appliedness output    
(1/1+2+3+4)
Appliedness researchers 0.807*** 0.550*** 0.784*** 0.547***
[0.061] [0.063] [0.070] [0.067]
Interaction (collaborative) -0,037 0.196** 0.024 0.207**
[0.090] [0.093] [0.116] [0.100]
Appliedness firms 0.246** 0,025 0.322*** 0.046
[0.096] [0.107] [0.112] [0.130]
Av count (researcher) 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Intercept total count (firms) -0.116 -0.016
[0.091] [0.034]
Slope total count (firms) (x100) 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0,002 0,012 0.016 0.011
[0.038] [0.014] [0.054] [0.022]
Observations 487 487 487 487
R-squared 0,351 0,27 0.356 0.271
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1. Appliedness of output as a function of the appliedness and publications of researchers and firms.
Count         
(output)
Weighted count 
(output)
Count         
(output)
Weighted count 
(output)
Count         
(output)
Weighted count 
(output)
Total grant funding (£000) 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Av count (researcher) 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.022***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Av weighted count (researcher) 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.066***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012]
Intercept total count (firms) -0.744** -0,288 -0,249 -1.114***
[0.321] [0.370] [1.583] [0.386]
Slope total count (firms) (x100) 0.019** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.021**
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009]
Intercept total weighted count (firms) -2.728** -4.505***
[1.342] [1.681]
Slope total weighted count (firms) (x100) 0.031*** 0.033***
[0.011] [0.011]
Number of firms -0.167** -0.830***
[0.068] [0.287]
Distance appliedness researchers firms -0.768* -3.571*
[0.450] [2.042]
Constant 1.772*** 2.280** 1.759*** 2.236** 2.284*** 4.737***
[0.258] [1.032] [0.257] [1.024] [0.395] [1.742]
Observations 487 487 487 487 487 487
R-squared 0,117 0,189 0,128 0,203 0.122 0.194
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in brackets
Table 2. Quality of the project as a function of the partner's scientific level and distance in types
